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Preface
This paper which is the second in a series of initiatives intended to evaluate the 
economic performance of member countries of the Caribbean Development and Co­
operation Committee (CDCC) over a ten year period, has its genesis in the document 
entitled " An evaluation of the Economic Performance of CDCC countries (1974-1984)", 
reference number LC/CAR/G.182, dated 1 March 1986.
The initial document had as its objective a general overview of economic 
developments in the sub-region, taking as its departure point the first oil shock, which 
began to have its impact on Caribbean countries in 1974. It attempted to trace the 
structural changes which had taken place in these economies over the ensuing ten 
years, and was intended to complement the shorter term view taken in the annual 
economic surveys where such shifts might not be as clearly discernable.
While the initial document was of the nature of a stock taking exercise, it was 
intended that subsequent initiatives would focus on specific topics of interest. The 
external debt has been selected for this issue, for while it can be properly regarded as 
a symptom of past policies, it has nevertheless become an issue in its own right. 
Moreover, the debt was virtually ignored in the original survey, due to a scarcity of data. 
While this deficiency is now being partly remedied at the national level, there is, 
nevertheless, little work so far on the external debt as it relates to the Caribbean region 
as a whole, and there remains a lack of clarity as to whether the region has a debt 
problem, and if so what is its genesis, what are its characteristics, its effect on 
development, and what measures might be taken to limit its impact. This paper is 
accordingly, an attempt to initiate an examination of some of these issues.
The data used in the evaluation are compiled primarily from the annual 
economic surveys conducted by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC,) which in turn rely essentially on official sources of national data; 
and, on the specialized subregional institutions such as the Caribbean Development 
Bank (CDB), and the East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). Data from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (IBRD) are used quite extensively in the section 
relating to global developments, and in those segments of the regional analysis relating 
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For Latin America the external debt has been 
*■ o  the major international policy issue since rnid-1982,
Ë X 6C U TIV 6 o U m m a r y  and it continues to dominate the agenda of North-
South discussions to the present time. This is not 
surprising, since six Latin American debtors account 
for over 88% of the exposure of the major banks to the developing countries1 and 
instead of being resolved despite intense effort over the past six years, the problem of 
the debt continues to be as intractable as ever.
For the Caribbean the debt as an issue has until recently been down-played . 
partly because of the smaller overall magnitudes which are involved and the fact that 
their debt management initiatives have involved the bilateral donors and the multilateral 
financial institutions rather than the major private banks. These initiatives have 
accordingly not been regarded as newsworthy. Yet for some of the countries surveyed 
the problem is just as intractable as for the larger debtors, evidence of debt service 
difficulties coming to light as early as 1978. Moreover, many of the innovations which 
are currently being explored with the private banking system, in order to achieve some 
measure of debt relief, are denied Caribbean countries since their debt is primarily 
owed to governments or the Multilateral Financial System.
While taking the openness of Caribbean countries and their consequent 
vulnerability to external shocks as given, major emphasis has been placed on an 
evaluation of domestic policy choices. This orientation is made even more valid since 
the debt incurred in Caribbean countries, with the partial exception of the Dominican 
Republic, is either government incurred or guaranteed as a consequence of the growth 
of state or para-statal enterprises. Accordingly some time is taken in each case to 
examine the fiscal budget, its growth, its volume and the emphasis given to public 
expenditure, bearing in mind its ultimate impact upon the external account, and the 
external debt.
The three major debtor countries, the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica, 
have a number of characteristics in common, they are highly dependent on sugar and 
minerals, mainly bauxite for their export earnings, they are highly dependent upon 
petroleum for their energy needs, and they misjudged the nature of international 
developments in the mid-1970s implementing expansionary fiscal programmes, in an 
attempt to sustain artificially high levels of economic activity at a time of declining 
revenues, so that fiscal deficits became uncontrollable. All three countries had by this 
time achieved extensive government ownership of productive enterprises which were
1 Source: B.I.S., International Banking and Financial Markets. Relates to the period 
June 1986.
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losing money, so creating a drag on the taxpayer. As a result of this combination of 
factors their debt burden has grown rapidly over the survey period.
The seven countries comprising the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS)2 treated in this section demonstrate in acute form the constraints faced by small 
open island economies. Moreover, as members of one currency area with one central 
bank, which acts within statutory limits on the extension of credit to member countries 
and which requires unanimity of membership on any change of parity, a measure of 
flexibility in the use of monetary and exchange rate policies for adjustment which is 
available to other countries surveyed is denied them. The strong link between fiscal 
policy and the external debt which is evident in the other countries surveyed is therefore 
even more accentuated in the case of the OECS countries.
The result of these factors is that a shock to the economy whether generated 
externally, or otherwise such as by natural disasters, is usually passed through without 
the usual measures of insulation. While this means that adjustment is often painful and 
immediate it also ensures that there is little leeway for postponed adjustment thus 
ensuring that many aspects of disequilibrium are not allowed to become chronic and 
cumulative.
For the most part, therefore, the debt has not become as severe a problem for 
the OECS as is the case in other countries and servicing the debt has for most 
countries been manageable. Nevertheless, there are quite significant differences 
between these and the other countries surveyed and among the countries themselves 
which are worthy of further investigation.
The other case treated, that of the petroleum producing country of Trinidad and 
Tobago, provides an interesting contrast to the other countries surveyed since it 
operated on a different phase of the trade cycle. The two oil shocks accordingly 
produced windfall gains for Trinidad and permitted rapid economic expansion at a time 
when other Caribbean countries were grappling with the problems of contraction.
Yet, similar underlying economic philosophies also encouraged expansion of 
public expenditures, both recurrent and capital. In the former case the rationale was 
employment creation and an attempt to better fit the public sector to manage the 
process of development. In the latter an attempt to capture windfall profits from 
petroleum so as to diversify the economy and accelerate development. Nevertheless, 
as petroleum prices contracted after 1982, Trinidad faced many of the problems 
bedeviling the oil dependent debtors, such as the need to implement a sufficiently
2 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are the seven island states comprising the OECS.
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timely and effective adjustment to reduced revenues, and to reduce the burden on the 
budget of large public enterprises that were not viable. As in the case of other 
Caribbean countries, policy shifts were difficult to execute so that, by the end of the 
survey period, signs of a debt problem were discernable as was the need to increase 
the pace of economic adjustment if Trinidad and Tobago was not also to face the 
dangers of excessive debt.
In conclusion two major themes have permeated the study. The first is the nexus 
between the fiscal account, the external account, and the external debt. The second 
which is a corollary to the first, evaluates the rate of growth and the composition of the 
fiscal deficit.
Public expenditure policy provides a clear understanding, in the countries 
surveyed of the reasons for the growth of the external debt. When this related to 
current expenditure and the debt was incurred for activities which would not be self- 
liquidating benefits derived from such expenditure would be chimerical since they would 
have to be cut back in the future. Moreover, as these artificial benefits would have been 
internalized, reduction or discontinuation of them would be seen as an undue hardship 
by the beneficiaries. Debt incurred for capital expenditure, however, held the prospect 
for repayment but repayment would only be forthcoming over the long-term in the case 
of infrastructure, or if a number of conditions necessary to secure commercial viability 
were met in the case of directly productive activities.
For the countries studied, the debt was incurred for three principal purposes:
(a) To sustain the level of economic activity and often non-productive 
employment during a period of foreign exchange shortage, caused by the two oil 
shocks and reduced earnings from exports. The assumption on the part of the policy­
maker was that the foreign exchange constraint would be temporary and the debt 
would be repaid as the export boom returned. The assumption did not hold, however, 
since the debt was incurred at historically low but variable rates of interest, which were 
soon to return to the normal trends. Moreover, the export boom period of the late 
sixties and early seventies was not to return so that repayment became problematic.
(b) To achieve some measure of structural transformation. Efforts bv the state 
in this regard may be divided into two phases:
(i) Initially, emphasis was placed on the structure of ownership moving away 
from foreign and private to local and public ownership and control. This 
was characterized by the acquisition of existing and often declining 
activities added to which was in-experienced and often deficient 
management. Accordingly, the internal efficiency of the firms declined at 
the same time that external conditions were forcing international
competitors to become more cost effective. Foreign exchange surpluses 
were therefore not generated to repay the debt, indeed the converse was 
true so that these enterprises served to increase the debt burden.
(ii) The second phase of structural adjustment was initiated in recognition of 
the changing patterns of international trade which did not favor the export 
of raw materials and primary commodities but rewarded the development 
of manufactures and services. While debt incurred for adjustment would 
ultimately generate new sources of foreign exchange, the process by 
which new export generating ideas could be identified and the necessary 
resources put into place was necessarily long and fraught with risk. The 
urgent need to reorient activities to new ways served to highlight the lack 
of adequate depth in human skills, which while proving to be adequate to 
perform the familiar and well worn socio-economic tasks were unable to 
provide a sufficiently rapid and flexible response to rapidly changing 
external conditions. For the countries surveyed the debt incurred for this 
purpose was obtained for periods which are too short to show returns 
before repayment, so that rescheduling has become an ongoing 
characteristic of debt management.
(c) To establish directly productive activities, as the state in an effort to force 
the pace of growth, became involved in relatively large commercial ventures. These 
projects which had been financed on strictly commercial terms often concealed a large 
infrastructural component. Moreover, sufficient attention had not been paid to their 
commercial viability, due both to an inadequate understanding of international marketing 
trends, or due to an underestimation of the importance of managerial competence on 
overall operational efficiency. Accordingly, projects came on stream which were of 
suspect viability, constituting a further source of debt. Even where the conceptual hurdle 
of divestment had been overcome, local private investors were hesitant to take the risk 
of trying to turn around large enterprises which had proved ill- conceived. In other 
cases, where the projects were viable they were often so large as to create a severe 
debt servicing burden in the short to medium-term.
The debt which must be seen as a symptom of past policy choices had, 
nevertheless, for a number of the countries surveyed, become a severe impediment to 
future economic growth, and absorbed so much of the recurrent budget that basic 
services such as health and education had to be severely curtailed. There is currently 
no realistic expectation that sufficient growth can be achieved in the medium-term so 
as to grow out of the debt problem. Moreover in the cases of Antigua, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica the burden of servicing the debt was 
sufficiently onerous for them to have accumulated arrears at various times since 1978. 
Most of these countries were exploring measures appropriate to their specific debt
v¡¡
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problems in order to provide some degree of debt relief and some of these measures 
are discussed.
While changing future expectations quite drastically, the debt had also served to 
focus attention on the role of the state in economic activity and particularly the growth, 
size, and use of fiscal deficits. The debate about the desirability of state involvement is 
unresolved, but there now seems to be an emerging consensus that all enterprises 
should be subject to similar micro-economic disciplines, whether they are public or 
private. Moreover, there is a growing awareness of the limited capacity of the state 
apparatus to discharge its primary functions, so that an expansion into commercial 
activities is being regarded with greater caution than hitherto. This is especially true 
since government guarantees have tended to relax the safeguards normally applied by 
the lender to any commercial venture and public ownership tends to transfer the costs 
of failure away from those responsible for making the original decisions.
Finally, the period under review has brought about a clearer understanding of 
the manner in which the component parts of the economies interact as well as a more 
realistic search for the sources of real economic growth. It has also served to create 
a fresh awareness of the constraints facing the policy maker and therefore to caution 
him of the limits beyond which he might not go in his efforts to force the pace of 
development.
Introduction For Latin America the external debt has been
the major international policy issue since mid-1982, 
and it continues to dominate the agenda of North- 
South discussions to the present time. This is not 
surprising, since six Latin American debtors account 
for over 88% of the exposure of the major banks to the developing countries3 and 
instead of being resolved despite intense effort over the past six years, the problem of 
the debt continues to be as intractable as ever.
For the Caribbean the debt as an issup has until recently been down-played 
partly because of the smaller overall magnitudes which are involved and the fact that 
their debt management initiatives have involved the bilateral donors and the multilateral 
financial institutions rather than the major private banks. These initiatives have 
accordingly not been regarded as newsworthy. Yet for some of the countries surveyed 
the problem is just as intractable as for the larger debtors and many of the innovations 
which are currently being explored with the private banking system in order to achieve 
some measure of debt relief, are denied them since their debt is primarily owed to 
governments or the Multilateral Financial System.
The debt must, however, be seen against the somber backdrop of the region’s 
poor economic performance as a whole, to which it has now become a major 
contributor. Since 1981, Latin America has been suffering from "the most severe 
economic crisis for the last fifty years".4 The crisis which has persisted to the present, 
is widespread and multifaceted and has affected all categories of countries, though not 
all to the same extent. It has been characterized by a..'failure to achieve growth, 
external balance, and price stability simultaneously."
(Accordingly), "the sequential pursuit of these basic macroeconomic equilibria in 
recent years, oftentimes at the expense of one’another, has tended to render tenuous, 
if not short lived, what achievements there have been. Thus, inflation, (accelerated by 
heavy devaluations) or stagnation (due to compression of imports) has often, been the 
price of correcting external imbalances; recession and worsened income distribution 
(the outgrowth of unduly restrictive demand policies), the price of slowing inflation; and 
external maladjustment (due to overheated demand), the price of recovery. The 
cumulative effect of such see-saw policy responses has been to accentuate cycles in 
the region’s economies and so, to preclude solid and sustained growth."
3 Source: B.I.S., International Banking and Financial Markets. Relates to the period 
June 1986.
4 ECLAC: "The Economic Crisis: Policies for Adjustment Stabilization and Growth." 
(LC/G.1408 dd 4 April 1986)
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"Such instability is a reflection, not so much of policy shortcomings, as of the 
limited degrees of freedom imposed on policy by the acute scarcity of foreign exchange 
deriving from a long unfavorable external context and a heavy debt burden. This has 
made the region’s economies more sensitive to demand and supply shocks, be they 
external or domestic in origin."5
These comments made in the context of Latin America as a whole, are amply 
demonstrated in the case of the three major Caribbean debtors, the Dominican 
Republic, Guyana, and Jamaica, and some of these characteristics are present in other 
Caribbean countries to greater or lesser extent.
By 1987 the Latin American debt problem had become sufficiently intractable for 
Brazil to suspended interest payments on its debt, for Peru to limit debt service to a 
fixed percentage of its export earnings, and for Ecuador to announce a moratorium 
on its repayments, while a number of other countries such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua were in arrears on their interest payments.
In the Caribbean the situation was somewhat similar as Antigua, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica had accumulated arrears at various times 
since 1978, and most of these countries were exploring measures appropriate to their 
specific debt problems in order to provide some degree of debt relief. The following 
chapters attempt to shed some light on the causes and the structure of the debt 
problem in the Caribbean and to describe some of the measures being explored to 
secure relief.
While taking the openness of Caribbean countries and their consequent 
vulnerability to external shocks as given, this paper has placed major emphasis on an 
evaluation of domestic policy choices. This orientation is made even more valid since 
the debt incurred in Caribbean countries, with the partial exception of the Dominican 
Republic, is either government incurred or guaranteed as a consequence of the growth 
of state or para-statal enterprises. Accordingly some time is taken in each case to 
examine the fiscal budget, its growth, its volume and the emphasis given to public 
expenditure, bearing in mind its ultimate impact upon the external account, and the 
external debt.
5 ECLAC: Economic Panorama for Latin America 1987. (LC/G.1481 September 
1987).
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The Debt in Caribbean For convenience the countries being evaluated
C o u n tr ie s  *n the Caribbean will be arbitrarily divided into two
categories, of high, and low debt exposure, in 
accordance with trends of debt/GDP and debt 
service as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services over the survey period as set out below:
SELECTED DEBT INDICATORS
Country Debt/G.D.P. Debt Service ratio
1977 1980 1986 1977 1980 1986
Guyana<i> 39.9
CATEGORY 1 
85.1 292.9 14.2 22.3 81.4
Jamaica 28.2 82.2 147.8 14.5 24.0 58.9
Dominican Rep<2> 27.0 31.8 70.8 30.7 59.7 18.0
Antigua
CATEGORY 2 
50.0 73.0 6.3 9.3
Dominica 33.2 62.9 *  ♦  ■* 4.1 9.1Grenada 22.9 52.5 •  »  « 4.1 15.8
Belize 28.3 45.2 •  »  « 1.4 9.7Haiti 20.5 34.2 •  •  • 4.9 12.0
St, Vincent 34.8 31.2 a « « •  ♦  # 3.5
St. Kitts/Nevis 26.2 29.5 «  •  • 1.1 8.3
Trinidad/Tobago 6.8 22.4 •  •  • 6.1 11.3Barbados 9.5 20.7 ■ •  • 1.9 6.7
St. Lucia 18.5 20.2 1.8 2.6Bahamas 8.4 9.9 •  »  « 2.6 8.8
Source: ECLAC, derived from national data.
<1> Includes arrears.
<2> Includes private debt; 1986 debt service ratio relates 
to interest payments only.
Table l
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The three major debtor countries, falling into category 1, have a number of 
characteristics in common. They are highly dependent on sugar and minerals, mainly 
bauxite for their export earnings, they are highly dependent upon petroleum for their 
energy needs, and they misjudged the nature of international developments in the mid- 
1970s implementing expansionary fiscal programmes, in an attempt to sustain artificially 
high living standards at a time of declining revenues, so that fiscal deficits became 
uncontrollable. All three countries had by this time achieved extensive government 
involvement in productive activities which were losing money so creating a drag on the 
taxpayer. As a result of this combination of factors their debt burden is quite high 
compared to the other major debtors in the region. (Figs.1 and 2.)
Nineteen seventy-six marked a watershed in the economic development of these 
countries, for it was at that time that the full impact of external events, (energy price 
rises having to some extent been cushioned between 1973-1975 by buoyant sugar 
prices and strong demand for minerals) and the effects of domestic policies came 
together to change the trend of economic performance from that which prevailed in
the previous decade. For these 
countries "the crisis" began in 
1976 and the debt is to be seen 
as the symptom of this crisis. It 
is nevertheless, also true to say 
that for these countries the debt 
now, of itself, constitutes the 
major impediment to future 
growth, a claim which cannot be 
made for other Caribbean 
countries at the present time, 
with the possible future 
exception of Trinidad and 
Tobago, which manifests 
different characteristics and will 
accordingly be treated  
separately.
While the period covered by this 
survey is 1977-1986, it is impossible to aet a clear insight into the genesis of the debt 
problem without an examination of the development path pursued by these countries
for the decade prior to 1977. The analysis will therefore open with a brief outline of
economic developments in these countries during that period. After 1977, the main 
theme of the paper will focus on the measures adopted in an attempt to cope with the
crisis of 1976; initially through financing mechanisms and their contribution to the debt;
and, latterly through structural adjustment measures, the financing of which made its 
own contribution to the Debt.
Caribbean countries.







Source; ECLAC, based on o f f ic ia l  data. 
* Relates to  PUMie and Private debt.
F i g u r e  1
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Indeed, by the end of the 
survey period that portion of the 
debt incurred with the 
multilateral financial institutions 
had become sufficient, both in 
terms of its volume and the 
inflexible conditions surrounding 
its repayment, to jeopardize the 
adjustment process it had been 
incurred to achieve. As the path 
of these developments is traced 
special note will be taken along 
the way of growing interest rates 
in the late 1970s, the second oil 
price shock, the global debt 
crisis of 1982, and the 
subsequent scarcity of new 
private capital inflows, decline in the demand for minerals, and the cumulative effect that 
these have had on the management of the debt.
L a t in  A n a r(C A / C a rib b s a n .
Selected Debt Service ratios
«G*S
1980 1981 1992 1999 1984 1989 1986
Year
Ü Ü ]  tardado* Antigua ISSSSá Dom. tap* ESS9 Jmmica E # # !  Guyana
* taiata* to  puaiic and ft” )vat* o m t.
Figure 2
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The Genesis of the For the countries examined in this section the
Debt Problem trends policies and outcomes show many similarities.
 ______________ Up to the beginning of the seventies economic
growth was rapid, and based essentially on foreign 
direct investment, followed closely by high external 
prices for minerals and sugar. In an atmosphere of relative prosperity, at a favorable 
point in the trade cycle, policy emphasis shifted from maximizing economic performance 
towards securing the ownership of such income generating activities into the hands of 
the state. As a consequence the state apparatus expanded so that pressure was 
placed on the budget to pay for newly acquired assets and to pay for the increased 
public service.
By 1973 the first oil price shock had begun to impact on the external accounts 
of all three countries, which were highly dependent upon petroleum imports for energy. 
The adjustment process was, however, postponed due to still buoyant export prices, 
and the failure of policy makers to judge the extent and duration of the petroleum price 
increases. These increases in turn were not automatically passed on to the consumers 
so that demand did not adjust to the increased price. When commodity prices declined, 
and soon after demand for bauxite/alumina contracted, the balance of payments 
became vulnerable, due to a number of factors which included: decreased earnings; 
increased expenditures for petroleum; and increased demand for imports not matched 
by productive output due to greatly expanded budget deficits.
In the Dominican Republic 1966 ushered in a return to internal stability after a 
period of civil conflict. This favorable development at the domestic level coincided with 
an external environment which was conducive to rapid growth. Accordingly, for the 
period 1966-1976, GDP growth averaged 7.6%. During this ten year period fiscal 
policies, which included a freeze on the size and wages of the public sector, were quite 
restrained, although deficits were incurred. The deficits were nevertheless sustainable, 
since at the end of the 1960s total foreign debt was 27% of GDP, and had actually 
fallen by 1976. Reserves increased steadily during the period.
Productive investment was encouraged through extensive tax and tariff incentives; 
the latter leading to the development of import substitution industries. Growth during 
the period was, however, essentially export driven, since earnings from traditional 
exports such as coffee, sugar, cocoa and tobacco, were booming. The minerals sector 
comprising ferro-nickel, gold, silver, and bauxite expanded rapidly in the seventies, from 
almost nothing to about 25% of export returns by the end of this phase; and services, 
such as tourism and those in the export zones began to grow.
In the light of such rapid export expansion, the impact of the oil price increases 
on the external account were initially cushioned by the concurrent boom in commodities
7
prices. The impact was also insulated from the consumers since the government 
decided in 1974 to use the high sugar prices to subsidize the increased oil prices. 
Consumption of petroleum products did not therefore respond to the increased 
international prices, and the adjustment opportunity offered by the boom was not 
seized.
The domestic investment policy based on tax and tariff incentives, while 
expanding activities had eroded the tax base, and encouraged the growth of some non­
competitive enterprises producing for the protected local market. Between 1966-1976, 
the contribution of such sectors to the GDP grew by 9%, while the contribution of non­
tradables, mainly construction, grew by 13%. This policy orientation had the effect of 
narrowing the foreign exchange earnings base, and ensuring that public sector savings 
were now only generated by those sectors benefitting from the commodities boom. 
The economy was accordingly made more vulnerable to the further external shocks 
which were to come.
On Guyana’s attainment of independence in 1966, the economy was driven by 
¡activities such as sugar production, bauxite mining and processing, and the distributive 
trades, all substantially owned by private foreign interests. Debt outstanding was modest 
and primarily to the United Kingdom in the form of bilateral loans (59%) and bonds 
(38%). Local business interests were limited to agriculture, local trading and minor 
manufacturing.
The post independence phase focussed on expanding economic and social 
infrastructure through major projects such as sea defences, rice rehabilitation, roads, 
airports, and electricity. While the projects for which the debt was incurred were not 
self-liquidating, no difficulty was experienced in servicing it since foreign exchange 
earnings had grown faster than the debt, the former increasing by 20% between 1966- 
70. Moreover, the loans were made on concessionary terms, at low interest rates and 
with long grace periods. Accordingly the debt service ratio actually declined from 4.3% 
of exports in the former year to 3.4% in 1970. The ratio of bilateral debt had by this 
time increased to 79% of the total, although contacts had recently been initiated with 
the multilateral institutions. Commercial debt remained insignificant at this stage.
In 1970 Guyana was declared a co-operative republic, with one of the central 
objectives being that of securing national ownership and control of domestic resources, 
a policy which was to have far reaching implications for Guyana’s debt profile.The debt 
incurred in 1971 due to nationalization accounted for 66% of the 83% increase in the 
foreign debt of that year. The cost of nationalization in terms of the debt was to grow 
further in coming years, so that by 1976 the debt incurred for that purpose was greater 







Debt co m p o s it io n .
Year
After its attainment of 
independence Guyana was able 
to further diversify its sources of 
foreign loans, and while bilateral 
debt continued to predominate 
the sources of these loans 
expanded to include non- 
aligned, eastern European and 
OPEC countries, in addition to 
the customary OECD sources. 
These funds were initially used 
for financing projects, but from 
1974 balance of payments 
support was also provided from 
bilateral sources.
Figure 3 Multilateral funding also 
grew steadily during this period
although the overall proportion was still modest at less than 7% of the total in 1976, 
funding going to finance infrastructure projects and to institutions such as the Mortgage 
Finance Bank and the Agricultural Industrial Bank, for on-lending.
Of even greater significance for the long-term debt profile was the growth in 
commercial debt, incurred to provide working capital for the nationalized entities. It 
began in 1973, at 8% of the total external debt, yet by 1976 had grown to 20%. This 
debt was to have serious implications for the long-term debt service, since it had short 
maturities, at variable interest rates, yet was used to finance long-term development.
From 1970-1976 Guyana’s external debt increased by 358%, yet until the 
previous year 1975, the debt service ratio was not significantly different from 1966 at 
4.4%, and this despite the impact of increased petroleum costs, which grew by 134% 
from 1973-1976. As was evident in other countries the commodity price boom of 
1974-1975 seemed to disguise the underlying deterioration of the economy and induced 
increased public sector spending, which in the case of Guyana grew by 197% between 
1973-1976. By 1976 the debt service ratio had however jumped, from 4.4% in 1975 to 
12.6% in 1976, and with declining output and external prices the stage was set for an 
economic and debt crisis.
Similarly, in Jamaica, the decade of the sixties saw relatively high rates of 
economic growth driven by strong external demand for bauxite/alumina exports and 
burgeoning tourism, which necessitated increasing investment in these sectors. The 
expansion was financed by net capital inflows in the form of private direct foreign 
investment. For the period 1966-1971 net private capital flows exceeded the current
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account deficit by almost 9%.6 This surplus together with modest official capital flows, 
official flows being on average 7% of private flows, together created a substantial 
increase in the reserves. In 1970 total external public debt was less than 16% of GDP, 
and debt service represented less than 3% of exports of goods and services.
For the first two years of the seventies the growth performance of the previous 
decade continued; but by 1973 the impact of domestic and external factors had caused 
a change in previous trends. On the domestic front public expenditures expanded 
rapidly, in an attempt to deal simultaneously with issues of equity, to expand public 
sector activities, and to consolidate public ownership of the main income generating 
sectors. Accordingly, the overall public sector deficit increased by 157% between the 
fiscal years 1971/72 and 1973/74, moving from 3% to 5% of GDP. At the same time the 
first effects of the first oil shock were about to be felt. In 1973 the external debt, 
reflecting these facts, but mainly due to the rapid growth in the fiscal deficit, grew by 
64%.
Between 1974-75 the full force of the oil price increases impacted upon the 
import bill, expenditure for fuels increasing by 195% between 1973-1975, equivalent to 
28% of merchandise exports compared to less than 15% in 1972. By the end of 1975 
the growth of export earnings which had hitherto been buoyant slowed down to 6%, 
output of the manufacturing sector peaking in 1973, and bauxite/alumina in 1974. The 
public sector deficit continued to grow, by a further 96% over the previous year resting 
at 9% of GDP for fiscal year 1975/1976. The external debt had by 1975 grown to 31% 
of GDP; the debt service ratio representing 7.4% of export earnings. Reserves which 
had begun to decline in 1972, continued to fall each year with the exception of 1974.
In 1976 a number of adverse developments, both domestic and external, came 
together to cause the collapse of the economy; export prices fell; output fell for sugar, 
bananas and alumina; and tourism receipts which had been declining steadily from 
1972, fell by 38% over the previous year; and, as a consequence of this conjuncture 
of events export earnings as a whole declined by 15%. Reflecting the decline in the 
economy, current revenues declined by 8% in fiscal year 1976/1977 although current 
expenditures continued to grow by 26%. For the first time there was a current account 
deficit, and in an effort to stimulate activity in the economy capital expenditure also 
increased by 10%, the overall budget deficit increasing by 88% to represent 19% of 
GDP. Not surprisingly the reserves continued to fall, representing 0.3 months of imports 
by the end of 1976. The debt had by this time increased to represent 30% of GDP.
6 Jefferson, Owen, Some aspects of Jamaica's External Debt, Bank of Jamaica, 
January 1988.
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Evolution of the The ten year period 1977-1986 witnessed a
Debt Problem structural change in the global economy. Rates of
growth in the OECD countries had generally fallen, 
after an initial phase of high growth and inflation. 
The economic contraction was caused in part by a 
fear of the effects of continued inflation which had reached historically high levels and 
the principal means used to contain it, a contraction in the money supply, had the 
effect of slowing down growth and increasing interest rates.
More fundamentally, however, due to the conjuncture of a number of 
technological developments, there had been a rapid reconfiguration of many economic 
activities, the growth of new ones, and the obsolescence of others. At the same time 
those activities having the most potential for future growth were knowledge, rather than 
labor or raw materials intensive, so that the relationship between growth in the industrial 
centers and growth in the demand for primary products from the developing countries 
had changed, to the disadvantage of raw materials producers. Producers of innovative 
and internationally competitive manufactured articles, both in the industrial centers and 
in some of the newly industrializing developing countries, had at the same time been 
favored.
This period of rapid change was also characterized by increased uncertainty and 
unpredictability in the system of international trade and finance, due in part to the 
aforementioned changes in production technologies and shifts in demand, but also 
because of the rapidly growing degree of integration in the international economy. The 
consequence was rapid and unforseen reactions to nullify domestic policy measures, 
rapid and enormous shifts in capital and goods, rapid changes in exchange rates, and 
the intensification of protectionist measures, sometimes in response to the above. 
Attempts to coordinate the policies of the economies of the major industrialized 
countries had lagged behind such developments, and accordingly the process of 
domestic economic development was made more complex.
These global developments had impacted adversely on Caribbean and Latin 
American countries as declining terms of trade and historically high interest rates made 
it difficult for them to meet the large debt obligations which had been incurred in the 
previous time period.
By 1977 the efforts of the international banking sector were focussed on recycling 
the petro-dollars and it was felt that as long as the process of recycling continued the 
deflationary impact of the oil price increase would be avoided. Interest rates at this 
time were historically low and often negative in real terms, though loans were made for 
short durations and at variable interest rates, and they were easily negotiated once they 
had received the imprimatur of governments. Once in possession of government
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guarantees creditors were not unduly concerned with the purposes for which the loans 
were incurred, and the debtors did not resist the temptation to use such funds to 
finance internal consumption of already overheated economies.
As interest rates began to recover, the cost of debt servicing became a serious 
factor and by the second oil shock the preconditions were set for the debt crisis.
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The Dominican The Dominican Republic after 1977 provides an
R e p u b lic  example of the high cost of postponed adjustment.
As is the case with Guyana and Jamaica the 
commodities boom of the early seventies provided 
the means to cushion the impacts of the first oil 
shock, but adjustment was further postponed even when the boom had run its course 
and surpluses were no longer available for the purpose. Renewed attempts were made 
to insulate against the effects of the second oil shock and to emphasize economic 
growth, with consequent rapid erosion of public savings, the foreign reserves, and the 
external debt.
Adjustment efforts began in 1982, only when the nation’s creditworthiness had 
been so eroded that no new funds were forthcoming to finance the domestic and 
foreign deficits. Accordingly, the measures finally adopted needed to be quite stringent. 
The stabilization programme, negotiated in conjunction with the IMF and which began 
in 1983 and included some debt rescheduling, was abandoned within six months.
After further policy uncertainty 
in the intervening period, a new 
adjustment programme was 
initiated in January 1985, which 
emphasized a realignment of 
exchange rates, deflation of the 
economy and refinancing of the 
debt. By the end of the survey 
period some success had been 
achieved in restoring economic 
equilibrium but at quite high 
social cost and the indications 
were that reflation of the
economy had begun earlier than 
had been planned and before 
an adequate degree of
adjustment had been achieved.
Output grew fairly strongly in 1977 and 1978, but as the aforementioned shocks 
hit the economy, GDP growth faltered in 1978 and actually declined in 1980. Fairly high 
rates of growth were achieved in the following period particularly in 1981 and 1983, but 
this was achieved at high cost in terms of the external account, the reserves and the
debt. Such growth was unsustainable so that with the onset of adjustment the economy





 Fisc bal — BOP* - Tax revenue - ♦ “ GDP growth
S o u rc e  E C LA C . b u i d  on official data.
• rotara to currant account
F i g u r e  4
13
of the survey period growth was again being stimulated, although significant imbalances 
remained in the economy (Figure 4).
Public sector savings in the Dominican Republic in 1977 were generated by taxes 
on a narrow range of export commodities such as sugar, cocoa, coffee, tobacco and 
by import duties. Property taxes are almost non-existent and income taxes are low. 
When the commodities boom ended government revenues therefore fell, at a time when 
imported energy prices were poised for their second increase. The impact of rising 
energy prices on the economy was greater than it might have been since government 
savings were being used to meet a part of the price increase. Accordingly, consumption 
of energy products did not fall commensurately with the rise in prices, a factor which 
increased the impact on the external account. At the same time a number of basic food 
items, many produced by public enterprises or imported, incurred increased subsidies 
or reduced duties in an attempt to insulate the population against the rising cost of 
living. The consequent severe impact on the government savings, the balance of 
payments and the debt were therefore predictable.
Tax revenues which had amounted to 17% of GDP in 1970 fell to 11% by 1978 
where it remained until 1982 reaching a low of 9%. This figure compares with almost 
29% for Jamaica in the same year. With the onset of the adjustment programme in 
1983 and a reformed tax structure, which included an emergency surcharge on imports 
of 10% and increased rates for electricity, revenues recovered somewhat to stand at 
13% by the end of the survey period.
Erosion of the external 
balance was also rapid after 
1977, the current account deficit 
growing from US$-265m. in that 
year to a low of US$676m. by 
1980, the fuel bill alone 
accounting for US$270m of the 
increase and moving from 22% 
of merchandise imports to 30% 
in 1980. From 1980 the deficit 
on current account began to 
contract primarily due to the 
compression of imports,
essentially consumer goods, so 
that by 1984 fuel imports 
constituted 40% of the
(contracted) imports. After 1982 
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stable, the current account deficit declining to about US$200 million by the end of the 
survey period. (Figure 5).
Reserves were rapidly depleted after 1977, when they stood at about US$1 m., 
to US$391 million in 1981. Within two years this deficit on the reserves had almost 
doubled to US$781 m, the rapid erosion of the external account reflecting in part the 
undervalued exchange rate. During the period there was also significant capital flight, 
itself a reflection of loss of confidence in the economic policies being pursued. 
Between 1982 and 1984 the average exchange rate depreciated by about 90% and 
together with other adjustment measures impacted favorably on the balance of 
payments.
The external debt increased 
from about 27% of GDP in 1977 
to almost 32% in 1980 at which 
time it required the equivalent of 
12% of exports of goods and 
services to service the 
government guaranteed portion 
of the debt. The most dramatic 
increase in the debt was 
recorded in 1980, of 58%, 
although in the next three years 
it increased by almost another 
52%, standing at almost 
US$3300m by the end of 1983. 
Servicing the debt now required 
18% of exports although this 
had declined from the previous 
year which required 22%. The 
decline was due to a 
rescheduling which took place in early 1983, in conjunction with the IMF programme. 
For the period 1984-1986 inclusive there was a further increase in the overall debt, but 
the rate had moderated somewhat to 10% for the period, due in part to concerns about 
the overall size of the debt which now represented 71% of GDP and the cost of debt 
service. The latter had however, decreased slightly to require just under 18% of 
exports.
Changes in the composition of the debt are illustrated (Figure 6). In 1978 private 
debt amounted to 50% of the total but this was to show a steady decline over the 
survey period to 45% in 1980, and 42% by 1986. The selection of 1986, however does 
not provide an accurate picture of the trend in the interim, for as the overall debt 
increased, the proportion of government guaranteed debt increased. This trend
Dominican Republic.
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became most marked after 1983, which registered a fall in the proportion of private 
debt from the level of 1982 to 34%, the figure dedining slowly thereafter, until the last 
year of the survey period which showed increased private flows due to the imprimatur 
of the IMF programmes. During the period bilateral and multilateral flows grew at 
moderate and steady rates.
The Dominican Republic has been active throughout the survey period in an 
attempt to improve the terms and conditions relating to its debt, and yet has 
experienced difficulty in meeting its obligations. While government had been able to 
obtain its external financing on favorable terms up to 1975, with growing current 
account deficits it became necessary to seek new sources of funding from the private 
commercial banks, despite the imposition of less favorable terms.
Management of the debt portfolio became a pressing government priority by 
1976 and a moratorium was agreed in that year for US$60m to finance oil imports in 
1977. Refinancing of US$360m. of the external public debt was also negotiated in 1979 
which increased the share of long-term credit from 51% to 59% of total debt. Despite 
this respite arrears continued to accumulate in 1980. In early 1982 an agreement was 
entered into between the central bank and commercial banks to reschedule US$400m 
in arrears.
In December 1983, a further debt renegotiation was carried out for US$500m. to 
defer payment for five years with a one year grace period ending in January 1985. 
Efforts to renegotiate the bilateral debt were delayed in 1983 and 1984 pending an 
agreement with the IMF, which was finally negotiated in December 1984.
In 1985 comprehensive negotiations were once more conducted with the private 
banks for US$790m. extending the period of repayment to 13 years with a grace period 
of three years and a semi-grace period of two years and interest at 1 3/8 over LIBOR. 
The debt outstanding to the Paris Club was by now US$290m, of which US$172m 
represented arrears up to December 1984. New repayment periods were agreed at 
rates which were determined by the individual governments, but in general the terms 
were less favorable than had been agreed with the commercial banks earlier in the 
year.
For the first eight months of 1986 repayments proceeded in accordance with the 
agreements reached in 1985, but on accession of a new government new policies were 
articulated regarding the cost of debt service and by the end of the survey period 
renewed negotiations were in train, and various measures being mooted such as debt- 
equity swaps in order to ameliorate the debt burden.
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Guyana In 1977 the economy of Guyana had begun
to contract after a period of steady growth 
throughout the decade. An increase of 29% in real 
G.D.P. had been achieved between 1970-1976, but 
1977 recorded a real G.D.P. contraction of 2.6%, 
and started a phase of stagnation which was to continue throughout the survey period 
(Fig-7).
As was the case in other 
countries the fall in commodity 
prices precipitated the economic 
decline, a fall in sugar prices 
being most noteworthy, but 
domestic factors also played 
their part. Foremost among 
these was a decline in output 
caused by organizational and 
m anagem ent problem s  
consequent upon the 
nationalization of the main 
productive sectors, including 
sugar, bauxite, trading 
companies, oil refining, 
communications, and some 
manufacturing enterprises. A 
failure to adjust to these 
declining conditions must also 
bear some blame for subsequent further deterioration. In this regard it will be noted that 
the fiscal current account deficit increased steadily between 1977 and 1984,1982 being 
the sole exception to that trend. Accordingly the external debt consequent on 
nationalization represented 22% of the total debt and exceeded the debt incurred up 
to 1970.7 While the debt created a significant foreign liability, it did not bring forward 
new productive capacity, the change of ownership in fact precipitating a decline in 
output.
Between 1978 and 1980 a number of programmes were initiated with the IMF. 
A standby agreement was negotiated in 1978 which had some success in reducing the 
overall public sector deficit from 22% of G.D.P.in 1977 to about 6% in 1978, although 
current expenditure in fact increased slightly. In 1979 an Extended Fund Facility was
7 Danns, D. - Guyana’s Debt Problem. Paper presented to the 19th Regional 
Programme for Monetary Studies, November 1987.
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initiated but abandoned in the same year as it failed to meet targets in the external 
sector, due to continued stagnation in export earnings and the impact of the second 
oil price shock. Reduced G.D.P. was recorded for the year. A third Extended Fund 
Facility was formulated for 1980 and adopted in 1981 which emphasized increased 
production and diversification, and measures to contain the oil price bill. Export earnings 
for 1980 were quite good due to high prices received for bauxite products, sugar and 
rice. Accordingly merchandise 
earnings hit a peak from which 
it was to decline to the end of 
the survey period. The increase 
proved particularly fortuitous 
since it provided a cushion 
against the doubling of oil prices 
in 1979/1980, still allowing a 
G.D.P. growth of about 2%.
For the three years 1981 - 
1983 G .D .P . declined  
consecutively, the most 
significant fall being recorded for 
the years 1982,1983. Economic 
contraction is attributable to a 
decline in export earnings for 
Guyana’s main exports, bauxite, 
sugar and rice. (Figure 8)
Output contracted due to 
intractable technical, financial and organizational problems in the industries, to which 
was added poor weather which further affected sugar and rice yields. At the same time 
earnings were affected by weak external demand and the consequent falling prices. 
These developments precipitated a devaluation in mid-1981.
During this period public finances continued to deteriorate since expenditures 
continued to rise while revenues, reflecting poor economic performance, declined. Most 
significantly, however, public corporations which had previously contributed to the 
current account now became a drag on the public purse, necessitating increased 
borrowing. The fiscal deficit on current account continued to decline, by 1983 
representing more than 20% of GDP.
The external debt in 1977 stood at 40% of G.D.P. and the debt service burden 
had started to grow rapidly, standing at 14.2% of exports in that year, and up from a 
mere 4.4% two years earlier, for as the debt Increased export earnings had started to 
contract due in part to weakening external prices. In the following year Guyana had 
already reached the limit of its debt servicing capacity and was forced to reschedule
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some of Its debts. Yet between 
1978 and 1983 the external 
public debt more than doubled 
and the debt service ratio
moved from 15.3% to almost 
53%.
The composition of the debt 
had by this time changed, new 
inflows coming mainly from 
bilateral and multilateral donors, 
as well as the multilateral 
financial institutions such as the 
IMF, IDB, and the World Bank, 
in their attempts to assist the 
government to stabilize and
adjust the economy. In fact 
bilateral debt peaked in 1980, to 
decline slowly thereafter. 
Multilateral debt had grown slowly but steadily from 1977 and was to surpass bilateral 
debt âfter 1985. (Figure 9)
Public sector enterprises continued to loom large in the demand for new funds, 
foreign financing being needed by some domestic enterprises not having the capability 
to repay in foreign exchange. Accordingly commercial debt was to increase steadily 
until 1980 tapering off slowly thereafter as no new money was forthcoming. By 1980 
reserves had become negative, by almost US$185m. and by 1981 the system had 
begun to accumulate arrears in the servicing of the debt. In 1982 it became necessary 
to engage in a further rescheduling exercise. Moreover it was now becoming 
increasingly difficult to obtain new external financing since arrears were accumulating
at an increasing rate, US$34m in 1981, US$126m in 1982, to US$270m in 1983.®
For the years 1984 to 1986 the economy resumed moderate growth averaging 
about 1%. Export earnings recovered from the nadir of 1983 and stabilized for the 
following three years at a figure marginally higher due mainly to recovering earnings 
from the bauxite sub-sector up to 1985, with sugar increases compensating in 1986. 
The exchange rate was adjusted twice in 1984, on the second occasion to move with 
a basket of five major currencies. While there was a slow erosion of the currency after 
that time it was still widely believed to be overvalued by the end of the survey period. 
Overall public sector fiscal deficits continued to grow, due mainly to the unresolved
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problems of the public sector enterprises. The central government current account 
deficit, however, declined to about 13% of GDP in 1986, showing a reduction over 1984 
when the deficit was greatest.
The period is characterized by a modest increase in the actual inflows of new 
debt, in fact 2% growth between the end of 1983 to 1986, due mainly to an inability to 
secure new loans the increases, such as they were, coming from multilateral sources. 
Debt arrears had continued to mount rapidly, reflecting the inability of the economy to 
meet outstanding obligations. In 1983 the country was able to meet almost one half of 
its debt servicing costs, but by 1986 this capacity was reduced to only 16.5% of 
scheduled debt repayments.9
Due to the unavailability of external funds government deficits were increasingly 
covered by local borrowing after 1982. While emphasis has not been placed on the 
internal debt in this paper, note should also be taken of its growth, which impacts 
upon the money supply, the rate of inflation and ultimately upon the external account.
By the end of the survey period the Guyanese economy was in a state of torpor. 
Disbursed debt amounted to US$706m, a 2% growth over the previous year, while 
arrears in excess of that figure had accumulated, at US$771 m. The external debt 
including accumulated arrears stood at the equivalent of 293% of G.D.P. The total 
amount of debt service falling due was over US$202m, equivalent to 57% of GDP and 
over 80% of export earnings, yet the system was only able to meet 16% of this figure. 
Despite this small outflow there was a negative transfer of resources as outflows 
exceeded new inflows by 138%. In the same year imports into the economy amounted 
to 102% of total export earnings, and net international reserves were US$-543m.
Guyana has taken several initiatives to cope with its debt burden. While it has 
undertaken to pay all its debt it has nevertheless assigned priorities to the various 
categories of debt for repayment purposes, to favor the multilateral debt. In fact it has 
not been able to fulfill its obligations to all the institutions in this category, far less to 
meet its obligations consequent on nationalization, to the bilateral creditors or to the 
commercial banks.
Debt rescheduling has already been mentioned, that of 1982 involving a 
consortium of twenty-nine banks, in which principal owed was converted into a long­
term loan with interest rates being 2.5% above LIBOR. Agreements have also been 
entered into with individual creditors for specific sums, such as ALCAN, for debt owed 
for nationalization of bauxite installations, to provide a five year extension to the original
9 Danns, D. op. cit.
20
20 year agreement, retirement of the debt being made on the basis of supplies of 
bauxite.
Some countertrade arrangements have also been made in relation to CARICOM 
debt and efforts have been made to convert some loans to grants. These measures 
worthwhile as they are, do not significantly relieve the debt burden since relatively small 
sums are concerned. Moreover, multilateral debt for which there are no current relief 
measures comprises 20% of the total debt, or 40% if arrears are excluded.
The enormous debt problem has had serious negative effects on Guyana’s 
economy. The country is unable to obtain new financing for investment or even for 
suppliers’ credits to finance normal trade transactions. Consequent cash flow problems 
have forced the use of cash to finance current transactions, or as this is not available 
in sufficient quantities, to resort to counter trade. More significantly, individuals have 
resorted to informal measures in order to survive and a significant portion of the 
economy is no longer subject to formal regulation or even accounting. For the longer 
term, the need to operate on a day to day basis, has distracted policy attention from 
the need to take the fundamental longer term structural and organizational measures 
needed to reincorporate and resuscitate the economy.
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J â m â iC â  By 1977 the Jamaican economy was sufficiently
in disequilibrium to warrant a serious effort to 
readjust. The assumptions on which past policies 
had been predicated, and particularly the expectation 
of an upturn in export earnings, had not been 
realized and the economy continued in recession. Foreign commercial banks had 
suspended lending and social programmes continued to place heavy demands upon 
the budget.
Accordingly between 1977 
and early 1980 Jamaican 
economic policy operated in 
close relationship with the 
International Monetary Fund.
Measures to bring the economy 
once more into equilibrium were 
taken, and included a curb on 
public expenditures, restrictions 
on monetary expansion and a 
devaluation of the currency.
Not surprisingly in the 
light of these policy measures 
GDP contracted throughout the 
period. Yet imports, which 
contracted sharply in 1977 
continued to grow faster than 
exports thereafter. Public spending despite reductions in the capital account, continued 
to grow faster than both and so did the debt (Figure 10).10
While external capital flows resumed with the onset of Fund programmes 
domestic investor confidence had been sufficiently eroded for local capital flight, 
estimated at US$246 million in 1978, to nullify such inflows, which were US$176.5 
million.11 For the first time Jamaica had a net outflow of private capital. The 
phenomenon of capital flight was in this case fuelled by low investor confidence, 
negative real interest rates and a perception that despite a large devaluation the
10 Figure 10 shows the cumulative totals for the period.
11 Jefferson, Owen "Some aspects of Jamaica’s external debt" Bank of 









currency was still overvalued, given the underlying economic performance. This capital 
flight was to continue until 1983.
At the end of 1977 external debt stood at U.S.$926.2 million, or 28% of GDP, and 
the debt service ratio at 14.5%. By 1980 the debt had grown to US$ 1.7 billion, 
equivalent to 82% of GDP and the debt service ratio had increased to 24%, if interest
accruals are included. A trend was by now discernable for the debt to move away
from commercial banks, for whereas in 1978 40% of the total was owed to them this 
had fallen to 26% in 1980 and was to fall further to just under 11% by the end of the 
survey period. During the same time period bilateral debt moved from 30% of the total 
in 1978 to about 51% in 1986, and multilateral debt from 18% to 36%. The changed 
structure of the debt was to have implications for later debt management policy. (Figure 
11).
During the period 1977-1980 
economic policy was subject to
much national debate, I.M.F.
policies not achieving a
consensus within the
government and being
abandoned by early 1980. The 
adjustment process was 
therefore hampered by policy 
inconsistency and uncertainty, 
a factor which also contributed 
to capital flight, which continued 
albeit at a reduced rate in 1980 
in spite of an expected change 
of government policies. 
Accordingly, the unsettled 
domestic economic climate 
further contributed to the growth of the debt since it had to be incurred not only to 
finance current transactions but also to compensate for capital flight.
While the "mixed" economy advocated in the 1970s encompassed specific efforts 
by the state to reacquire lands owned by mineral and sugar companies; to expand the 
delivery of housing to low income groups; to develop state purchasing of bulk items 
and to increase its exposure in the media; a number of other acquisitions were 
undertaken in reaction to situations as they arose and were motivated by a desire to 
sustain activities that were in danger of closure, whether due to a lack of business 
confidence in the evolving government policies or in other cases of genuine insolvency. 
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As a consequence of these developments, by the end of 1980 the Jamaican 
Government had a portfolio of investments in directly productive activities of 198 
companies, 81% of which were wholly owned. The main categories were:
(a) Agriculture 51 enterprises 76% of which were wholly owned;
(b) Housing, 3 enterprises, 2 of which were wholly owned;
r
(c) Financing Institutions, 43 in total 40 of which were wholly owned;
(d) External trade, three wholly owned;
(e) Tourism, thirty entities, 83% wholly owned;
(f) Industry and Commerce, 49 enterprises 84% wholly owned;
(g) Public utilities, nineteen entities ranging from airlines to merchant shipping 
to tele-communications, eleven of which were wholly owned; and,
(h) Media enterprises, three, all of which were wholly owned.
By 1981 domestic economic policies had changed somewhat and a new 
Extended Fund Facility was negotiated with the I.M.F. Based on the premise that past 
years had witnessed a reduction in the capital stock, the new programme placed
continued reliance on external capital flows to resuscitate the economy. The structural
adjustment programme in 1981 was also designed to orient the economy towards 
export promotion rather than import substitution, to re-balance the fiscal and external 
accounts and to stimulate economic growth, with responsibility being placed on the 
private sector to provide the engine for such growth. A multi-year public investment 
programme was prepared so as to provide a broad overview of all public sector 
activities, to make their operations more transparent, controllable and responsive to the 
aims of the structural adjustment programme. In line with the declaration that 
government would provide a facilitating rather than direct role for the productive sector, 
a number of the existing public sector enterprises were to be closed, others earmarked 
for divestment to the private sector and the remainder to be put on a viable footing.
Judged by its stated objectives the performance with regard to the public 
enterprises was mixed. The overall quantum of public investment remained high and 
even grew, averaging 10% of GDP and half of total investment over the decade of the 
eighties. While the overall orientation of capital expenditure was away from the directly 
productive and social sectors towards public utilities and transport, there were some 
instances of increased investment in directly productive activities, such as the expansion 
of the Cement Company, the expansion of coffee production, or efforts to gain control
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of a bauxite operation which government had previously leasecj. Other injections of 
funds were necessary to prepare entities for divestment such as the refurbishing of 
hotels. But underlying many of the seeming contradictions the basic orientation was 
one of support for the private sector, resources flowing to them primarily through the 
National Development Bank and the Agricultural Development Banks.
Capital transfers to the rest of the public sector were significantly reduced as the 
financial performance of the public enterprises improved. Transfers to Agricultural 
Marketing Boards were reduced as they were put on an economic basis, and many 
programmes were transferred to producers and made self-financing. Electricity and 
water utilities recorded substantially improved performance and government disengaged 
from the area of low cost housing. Taken together with a complete reform of the tax 
system the overall public sector deficit had declined from as high as 22% of GDP to 
6.5%. 12
Moderate economic growth was 
achieved between 1981-1983, as 
opposed to contraction in the 
previous three year period, due 
to a heavy reliance on external 
capital flows, but this was 
achieved at the price of a rapid 
increase in the external debt, 
which grew on average by 19% 
between 1980-1983. Capital 
flight which had moderated 
between 1980-1982 was 
resurgent by 1983, reflecting 
once more a lack of credibility 
in the prevailing policies. Export 
earnings had also contracted 
Figure 12 after 1981, due to declines in
traditional agricultural exports, 
but especially in the alumina and bauxite sectors, hit by reduced global demand. The 
merchandise trade deficit accordingly increased significantly between 1980-1983 and in 
the light of the increasing debt so did the debt service ratio standing at 43% by 1983.
12 In fiscal year 1986-1987. This has been achieved despite a collapse of 
Jamaica’s major export, bauxite/alumina, and the losses of the Bank of Jamaica due 
to the debt consequent on the depreciation of Jamaica currency. The country has, 
however, paid a high price in terms of retrenchment in the public sector, reduction in 
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The latter would have been greater had it not been for a resurgent tourism industry 
(Figure 12).
By October 1983 the Extended Fund Facility which was due for completion by 
March 1985 had to be abandoned due to an inability to meet the planned targets. 
Central government deficits exceeded 16% of GDP at that time as compared to the 
target of 10.5%, and the Balance of Payments deficit was US$ 306 million compared 
with a target surplus of US$125 million. A major factor in the non compliance with 
targets was an unanticipated decline in alumina revenues, upon which the economy and 
all the targets had been dependent for viability.
The external debt had grown at undiminished speed in this phase to almost 
US$3 billion or 140% of GDP, by the end of 1983.13 Because of declining export 
earnings the debt service ratio had also increased from 24% in 1980 to 43% of export 
earnings, if accruals are included. Actual payments possible amounted to somewhat 
less, however, at 27.9%.
Between 1984 and the end of the survey period in 1986, a new emphasis was 
placed on adjusting the economy and managing the growing external debt. By the end 
of 1986 it was clear that these objectives were being realized, though at the cost of 
economic stagnation, nevertheless the debt represented almost 148% of GDP and the 
debt service ratio had grown to almost 59%.
This new policy was spearheaded by a one year standby arrangement with the 
International Monetary Fund which commenced in April 1984. It aimed to recover the 
time lost in implementing structural adjustment over the previous two years. At the 
same time and in recognition of the increasing debt burden the emphasis which had 
been placed in the past on capital inflows as the engine of growth was reduced, fiscal 
and monetary measures being substituted to stimulate domestic growth. Specific targets 
were set in the agreement in relation to reducing the central government deficit, 
achieving an overall balance of payments surplus and reducing the rate of credit 
creation. In support of these measures a floating band arrangement had been instituted 
in November 1983, in an attempt to establish an exchange rate equilibrium. By 
November 1984 the currency had been devalued by over 60% and the mechanism of 
floating with various modifications was to continue until the end of the survey period.
13 The figures are somewhat deflated since Central Bank debt, i.e. debt owed 
predominantly to the I.M.F., was not until recently Included in official debt figures. For 
1980 this amounted to US$67m., it had grown to US$1355m. by 1983, declining to 
US$1004m. by 1986.
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Domestic interest rates were moved to positive levels after a period of negative 
rates from 1978 and net private capital inflows resumed, totalling US$236.6 million. 
These inflows reduced the burden placed on the economy by the cumulative current 
account deficits of US$622.7 million so that the official flows could be used to cover the 
remaining gap and to rebuild the reserves. Accordingly the rate of growth of the debt 
moderated to an average of below 7% for the three years 1983-1986, a marked contrast 
to the previous three year average of 19%, between 1980-1983. By the end of 1986 the 
debt represented about 148% of GDP and the debt service ratio stood at 43%. The 
decline in international oil prices by the end of the survey period also served to provide 
a fillip to the economy and made many of the targets possible.
In 1978 Jamaica had reached the limits of its debt servicing capacity and sought 
to reschedule repayments of principal with the commercial banks. The exercise was 
repeated in 1981 and in each subsequent year to the end of the survey period. From
1981-1986 US$412.5m was treated in this manner.14
Ad hoc arrangements of a similar nature had also been worked out with various 
bilateral agencies, and were formalized in Paris Club meetings between 1984-1986. 
Between 1981-1986 US$932.6m of bilateral loans were rescheduled.
As indicated, the debt composition has moved steadily in favor of bilateral debt 
which was amenable to treatment within the Paris Club arrangements. The multilateral 
debt which encompasses a significant portion of the total is not, however, amenable to 
rescheduling, so that no relief has been available for that portion of the debt.
In an attempt to remove this constraint Jamaica had proposed that the IMF 
establish a new loan facility, or revive the little used Extended Fund Facility, that would 
be quick disbursing and policy based and could be used to repay due obligations. 
While establishing new debt it would provide longer maturities so having the same effect 
as a rescheduling. The proposal also was intended to induce Paris Club members to 
reschedule for longer periods than the one year period which is the norm, since IMF 
surveillance would provide a monitoring mechanism on their behalf.
Efforts have also been made by Jamaica to reduce the debt through the 
mechanism of the debt equity swap whereby a creditor bank might sell a hard currency 
loan to a foreign corporation, perhaps at a discount. The corporation in turn would 
present the obligation to the Central bank which would pay in local currency, currency 
which the corporation would in turn use to establish a new export oriented enterprise
14 Jefferson, Owen op.cit.
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in Jamaica. By the end of the survey period not much success had been achieved 
through this mechanism.15
From the preliminary analysis it was seen that the Jamaican economy was in 
serious disequilibrium prior to 1977. By that year Jamaica had entered into an economic 
adjustment programme with the Fund, and this relationship was to continue throughout 
the survey period, with two gaps, in 1980 and 1983, when two succeeding programmes 
had to be abandoned due to non-compliance with targets and new ones negotiated. 
In each case a new approach was taken, so that during the survey period Jamaica’s 
development policy might conveniently be divided into three phases as follows:
1. Reluctant adjustment from 1977-1980 Economic adjustment had 
become necessary by 1977, after a period of rapid expansion ushered in by an 
administration committed to using the public sector as the driving force for economic 
growth. Despite attempts to get involved in directly productive activities its primary focus 
was with redistribution and the delivery of social services, at a time when the underlying 
productive capacity of the economy was contracting. The need to change this policy 
by 1977 was not universally accepted, adjustment policies were seen as running 
counter to previous policies and holding the risk of eroding the benefits gained from 
previous years. Accordingly, the programme received less commitment than was 
necessary to make it succeed and it was abandoned in early 1980 in the midst of 
widespread policy debate as to its merits. A national election was accordingly called on 
that basis. During this three year phase the national debt increased at an annual 
average rate of 18.8%.
2. Expansionary adjustment from 1981-1983. The second phase was 
initiated on the assumption that renewed investor confidence would respond to a large 
injection of external resources to increase foreign exchange earnings, particularly in non- 
traditionai exports and minerals. Moreover it was expected that the new external 
resources would be forthcoming because of renewed confidence in the prevailing 
domestic policies and accordingly the issue of short-term stabilization was not 
emphasized. In the event the speed and magnitude of the adjustment which would be 
forthcoming was overestimated; resources, particularly private foreign investment did not 
flow at the anticipated speed; the creation of new non-traditional earners took longer 
than anticipated; and, most important of all, earnings from the minerals sector 
collapsed. In the circumstances adjustment with growth had to be abandoned since the 
cost of providing the necessary finance was too high. In this phase the external debt 
continued to increase at about the same rate as before of about 19%.
Davis, Novellette, "Debt Conversion: The Jamaican Experience." Research 
department, Bank of Jamaica. Paper prepared for 19th annual conference Regional 
Programme of Monetary studies, November 1987.
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3. Contractionary adjustment from 1984-1986. The third phase recognized 
the need to reestablish equilibrium prior to further expansion. For the two years that this 
policy was followed the economy showed encouraging signs of adjustment, though at 
a cost of great social and economic contraction. During this phase the debt continued 
to grow, though at a reduced rate of 6.5% per annum on average. The remaining 
question was whether the process would be given sufficient time to establish an 
equilibrium and whether an effective policy of investment and expansion could be 
grafted to it, such as to achieve a smooth transition from the short to the medium-term 
policies and ensure a long and durable process of economic growth to resume.
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Organization of Eastern The seven countries comprising the Organization
Caribbean States oi Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)16 treated in this
section demonstrate in acute form the constraints 
faced by small open island economies. Moreover, 
as members of one currency area with one central 
bank, which acts within statutory limits on the extension of credit to member countries 
and which requires unanimity of membership on any change of parity, a measure of 
flexibility in the use of monetary and exchange rate policies for adjustment which is 
available to other countries surveyed is denied them. The strong link between fiscal 
policy and the external debt which is evident in the other countries surveyed is therefore 
even more accentuated in the case of the OECS countries.
The result of these factors is that a shock to the economy whether generated 
externally, or otherwise such as by natural disasters, is usually passed through without 
the usual measures of insulation. While this means that adjustment is often painful and 
immediate it also ensures that there is little leeway for postponed adjustment thus 
ensuring that many aspects of disequilibrium are not allowed to become chronic and 
cumulative.
For the most part, therefore, the debt has not become as severe a problem for 
the OECS as is the case in other countries and servicing the debt has for most 
countries been manageable. Nevertheless, there are quite significant differences 
between these and the other countries surveyed and among the countries themselves 
which are worthy of further investigation. (Tables 1 and 2).
Over the survey period, the OECS countries had suffered from external shocks 
similar to those experienced by the rest of the Caribbean, namely, reduced demand 
and prices for their exports and oil price increases in 1979-1980 which caused a rapid 
deterioration in the external account. Subsequent increases in the price of manu­
factures further eroded the terms of trade.
At the same time shocks of domestic origin also impacted upon the economies 
notably in the banana industry, the main foreign exchange earning non-service activity, 
which was badly weakened in 1979 and 1980 by hurricanes in Dominica and St Lucia 
and by volcanic ash in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. As a result of these factors, 
exports of bananas declined by 50% between 1979 and 1980. By 1981 strenuous 
efforts at replanting had effected a recovery so that output in that year had regained 
1977 levels. Further expansion of the industry and diligent quality control assisted by 
fortuitous weather conditions allowed production increases of 75% by the end of the
16 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are the seven island states comprising the OECS.
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EXTERNAL DEBT - OECS COUNTRIES 
Debt outstanding at end of period (US$m.}
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Antigua 45.5 46*7 54.0 55.7 51.0 64.9 133.9
Antigua<2> 45.5 76,6 84*4 88.7 57.6 75,8 180.7
Dominica 17*7 24.4 34.4 40.9 43*8 48.8 56.6
Grenada 14.4 26.2 32,1 46.8 48.4 49.3 54.2St.Kitts 10.0 11*9 10.9 11*5 16.6 19.0 19.1St.Lucia 18.2 25,1 28.3 29.9 28.0 28*8 32.0St. Vincent 17.0 19.2 21*2 22.7 22.8 24.3 29.6
Montserrat 1.5 2.0 2*4 2.7 3,6 3.7 3.0
Source: ECCB; IBRD.
<l>Public sector incurred or guaranteed. 
<2>Including arrears
Table II
DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS - OECS COUNTRIES (US$m.)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Antigua 6.7 7.0 7.3 9.4 9.1 10.2 11,1Dominica 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.8 4.4 4.2 4.9
Grenada 1,6 1.5 2.2 2,2 6.4 8.6 7.6
St. Kitts 0*5 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.5 4.8
St. Lucia 1.4 1.5 4.2 2*0 3.1 4.3 3,3St. Vincent 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.3 3.1 3.1
Montserrat 0,1 0.1 0,1 0,2 0*4 0.4 0.3
Source: ECLAC; IBRD; CDB; OECS.
Table III
survey period, notable performances being recorded by Dominica after its total 
devastation, and Saint Lucia. Earnings from the industry fluctuated somewhat more 
than usual as a result of relative changes in the rates of exchange of the US dollar, to 
which the EC dollar is tied and the UK pound the currency of payment for bananas, 
so that in the early 1980s as the US dollar appreciated, local earnings fell relatively but 




exports include sugar, cocoa, 
spices and a small but growing 
manufacturing sector. Of these 
sugar is the most important, 
though being produced for 
export only in St. Kitts. It is 
nevertheless a declining industry 
there, as elsewhere in the 
Caribbean, with output peaking 
in 1979. Subsequently output 
and earnings have declined, 
from 40% of exports of goods 
and services of St. Kitts in 1981, 
to 20% in 1985. Falling output 
is due to reduced yields per 
acre as a consequence of 
drought, deficient management 
and inadequate harvesting practices, while earnings were further affected by reduced 
preferential quotas into the US market, in the face of production costs which make 
Caribbean sugar un-competitive at free market prices. Similar problems bedevil the 
other agro-based exports, volatile markets and low technology farming being endemic, 
while manufacturing has been geared to the protected regional (CARICOM) market 
which suffered from declining demand throughout the survey period. Manufacturing 
exports to third markets, mainly of the export processing enclave type, faced stiff 
competition from adjacent countries with higher labor productivity.
Merchandise export earnings stagnated between 1977 and 1979 for the 
aforementioned climatic reasons, although there was substantial recovery in 1980 with 
a jump in earnings of 64%.17 In the ensuing period growth was again slow, increasing 
by about 9% between 1980-1984. Rapid growth in merchandise earnings was again 
resumed toward the end of the survey period, lead by increased yields and good 
prices for bananas, with an increase of 41% between 1984-1986 (Figure 13).
While the OECS has managed to sustain its merchandise exports and increase 
them over time, it is tourism which has been the engine of growth for these countries.
17 Williams, A.M., and Augustine J.C., "Adjustment and External Debt in 
E.C.C.B. member states", Research Department, ECCB. Acknowledgement is due to 
the authors for providing the aggregative data on OECS member countries, which has 
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The performance of the tourist sector has been good, whether judged by the increase 
in long stay tourist arrivals, which grew by 81% over the survey period, or by estimates 
of gross tourism expenditures which increased by 300%. While foreign exchange 
earnings from the travel account have shown faster growth than merchandise exports, 
estimates of gross tourism earnings which might better reflect the true impact of the 
industry, suggest that tourism contributes considerably more foreign earnings in 
absolute terms than merchandise exports.18
The other main source of foreign earnings, private remittances, mainly from 
OECS nationals living abroad, also showed steady and sustained growth. Evaluation 
of the external account would be incomplete, however, without mention of the official 
grants which are provided from various sources and in various forms to the OECS. 
Grants equivalent to about 26% of merchandise exports were provided in 1979, the 
proportion declining steadily to about 19% of exports by 1983. In 1984 the quantum of 
grants rose significantly to 31%, due in part to special assistance to Grenada, although 
this has declined slowly thereafter to the end of the survey period.19
Imports have outstripped 
current earnings so that deficits 
on current account have been 
incurred throughout the survey 
period. (Figure 14). The deficits 
peaked at 29% of GDP between 
1980-1981 declining to 13.5% of 
GDP in 1985, although 
increasing once again to 16.5% 
by the end of the survey period.
The overall deficit of the 
grouping as a whole showed 
rapid growth between 1977 and 
1982 and again in 1986, the 
overall trends being significantly 
influenced by developments in Figure 14 
Antigua and Barbuda.
For example merchandise exports were US$ 86 m., US$ 169 m., and US$ 
245 m. in 1977, 1980, and 1986 respectively, compared with US$ 208 m., US$ 336 m., 
and US$ 828 m., for gross tourism earnings.
19 Williams, A.M., and Augustine, J.C. op. cit.
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Antigua and Barbuda recorded greatly increased fiscal deficits in 1978, during 
the period 1982-1983, and again in 1986. In each case the increases were caused by 
the public sector undertaking fairly large hotel investments which in turn required 
significant infrastructural support. Noteworthy also, is the fact that these large projects 
required financing at commercial rates in view of the ostensible nature of the 
investments, with a consequent impact upon the debt service profile.
Accordingly, the external debt for Antigua grew rapidly in two phases between 
1977-1981, at almost 30% per annum, so that the debt moved from almost 35% of GDP 
in 1977 to 75% of GDP in 1981. It was subsequently to fall to 42% of GDP in 1984 
before increasing sharply to 73% by the end of 1986 as a result of a US$160m. tourism 
project to run for the period 1986-1988 inclusive. Since the funds were obtained at 
commercial rates, average interest rates increased from about 4% in 1977 to 5.6% in 
1980 declining to 4% by 1984, but the average is projected to increase to 7% in 1987
Perusal of the traditional 
measure of debt service, in this 
case the ratio of debt service to 
exports of goods and services, 
the full impact of the debt 
service burden is concealed, for 
the ratio (including accruals) 
moved from 2.3% in 1977 to 
6.3% in 1980 and 9.3% between
1982-1983. Yet because of the 
large increase in new debt 
during 1986, the debt service 
ratio is projected to increase to 
12.6% in 1987 (Figure 15). 
Nevertheless, these ratios do not 
provide an explanation of the 
cause of debt arrears building 
up from 1980, when they were 
2.3% of GDP to the end of the 
survey period when arrears had accumulated to the value of 14.1% of GDP, and this 
might better be explained by the ratio of debt service obligations to government
revenues, which were 21.7% in 1980 and 19.8% in 1986.
In Dominica a rapid growth in the fiscal deficit in 1979-1980 reflected efforts at 
rehabilitation after hurricane damage. Subsequent expenditures remained quite high 
as the public expenditure programme focussed on restoring and upgrading support 
infrastructure in transportation, energy, health and water.
as the impact of the new phase of borrowing is felt.
O.E.C.S.
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During the period 1981-1985, Dominica operated under a stabilization programme 
with the IMF. which included a number of initiatives to increase revenues, reduce 
recurrent expenditures and eliminate transfers to loss making public enterprises. As a 
result of these efforts the overall deficit, after grants, fell from 35% of GDP in 1981 to 
about 20% in 1985, falling even further to 4% of GDP in 1986.
The external debt has grown steadily over the survey period from 14.4% of GDP 
in 1979, to 66% of GDP by 1983, debt being used mainly for hurricane rehabilitation 
and upgrading infrastructure. There was a modest decline in 1986 to 63% of GDP. Due 
to the concessional nature of the debt however, the cost of servicing it was more 
modest at just over 9% of exports by the end of the survey period. Debt is owing 
mainly to institutions, over 70% outstanding to the CDB. The IMF. is also a major 
creditor in view of continuing programmes since 1981.
Grenada recorded very rapid increases in the fiscal deficit after 1980, from 22% 
of G.D.P. to 45% of GDP. in 1982, due primarily to the costs of financing a new 
international airport, a single project which created a significant burden on that country. 
By 1983 the deficit had contracted to 35% of GDP. due to a containment of capital 
expenditure. From that year on the deficits were financed substantially by external 
grants in aid so that in 1974 although current expenditures continued to rise, the effect 
of grants and the further compression of capital expenditure reduced the deficit to 12% 
of GDP. The deficit was to grow once again in 1986 despite a further contraction of 
capital expenditures, since transfers to loss making public enterprises and interest 
payments on the debt had both increased. Moreover revenues decreased due in part 
to difficulties in administering a major fiscal reform programme.
Grenada’s external debt grew more slowly than GDP. between 1977 and 1980, 
declining from 15% to 12% of GDP. It grew by 79% however between 1981-1983, due 
to the impact of financing the airport, part of which was incurred at commercial rates, 
and other infrastructural projects so that the commercial component of the debt moved 
from a negligible amount in 1980 to about 30% of the total by 1983. Accordingly by 
1984, debt service ratios had increased rapidly from 6.2% in 1983, to 17.6% in the 
following year, and just over 20% in 1985. Further, arrears had started to build up by 
1983, continuing to the end of the survey period.
Public finance in St. Kitts-Nevls was dominated by two factors during the survey 
period. The first was the decline in current revenues from 33% of GDP. in 1981 to 25% 
in 1985, due to the abolition of income taxes and the sugar levy. This decline was 
arrested in 1986 by the implementation of new tax measures which increased current 
revenues to about 30% of GDP. The second major factor related to government 
involvement in the sugar industry, its decline in performance resulting from external 
factors as well as local management problems, and the assumption of the resultant 
debt of the National Agricultural Corporation (NACO).
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Both had significant impacts upon the overall fiscal deficit which has varied 
between 6-9% of GDP. with the exception of 1979-1980 when it averaged about 18% 
and again in 1985 on the assumption of NACO debt when the deficit rose to 15% of 
GDP.
The external debt grew fairly slowly from 1977 to 1983, in fact from 18% of GDP. 
to 23.5% of GDP. By 1985 this had increased to 31% declining slightly by the end of 
the survey period. Accordingly, debt service ratios which had remained fairly constant 
up to 1983 grew slowly to 1985 before recording a sharp increase in 1986 to 8.3%.
For the remaining OECS countries deficits were relatively moderate with an 
increasing trend between 1977 and 1982 decreasing thereafter to 1985, only to resume 
an increase in 1986. For all countries there has been a struggle to contain recurrent 
expenses, to moderate the public sector wage bill and to increase its efficiency so as 
to reduce the level of subventions to it. The perception that the government had the 
responsibility to act as the employer of last resort had lost the currency that it had 
acquired in the early 1980s, although the battle to control the growth of the public 
sector in such small economies remains a formidable one and highlights one of the 
structural limitations of very small size.
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Tobaqo had been rid'ng on the crest of the o i* 13001X1 which
began in 1973. In the three year period 1974-1976 
" inclusive the economy had grown by almost 4% per
annum on average; government revenues had 
increased at an annual average rate of 80%; while expenditures had also increased 
rapidly on average by over 50% per annum. Nevertheless, the fiscal balance which was
negative in 1973 at -2.4% of GDP grew thereafter to rest at 7% of GDP in 1976.
The external account also registered healthy gains, merchandise trade moving 
from a deficit in 1973 to record a surplus of TT$1850 m. for the three years. Similarly, 
the overall balance which recorded a deficit of TT$43m. in 1973, provided an increase 
of TT$2058m. to the reserves for the subsequent three years.
Trinidad and In 1977 the economy of Trinidad and Tobago
The external debt had declined relatively and absolutely between 1973 and 1976, 
from 10% of GDP in the former year to just over 2% in 1976. Unemployment had fallen 
by 2 percentage points during the period.
Similar trends were recorded for 
1977, but by 1978 a number of 
these trends began to change 
quite quickly, most noteworthy 
of these being a reduction in the 
rate of growth of exports with 
consequences for the 
merchandise balance and the 
fiscal surplus, the later falling 
from 9.6% of GDP in 1977 to 
2.7% of GDP in 1978. The 
abrupt change was consequent 
upon a reduction in the rate of 
foreign exchange earnings from 
mineral fuels, the increase in 
earnings in 1978 being 1.5% 
compared with an increase of 
15% in the previous year. 
Similarly government revenues 
recorded a drastic reduction in growth from 30% in 1977 to 4.5% in 1978. The 
dependence of the economy on the oil sector was clearly demonstrated at this time as
was the fact that while the revenue side could contract quite significantly in the short
term increases in expenditure both local and foreign were gathering a momentum that
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annum on average; government revenues had 
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1977, but by 1978 a number of 
these trends began to change 
quite quickly, most noteworthy 
of these being a reduction in the 
rate of growth of exports with 
consequences for the 
merchandise balance and the 
fiscal surplus, the later falling 
from 9.6% of GDP in 1977 to 
2.7% of GDP in 1978. The 
abrupt change was consequent 
upon a reduction in the rate of 
foreign exchange earnings from 
mineral fuels, the increase in
earnings in 1978 being 1.5%
compared with an increase of
15% in the previous year. 
Similarly government revenues 
recorded a drastic reduction in growth from 30% in 1977 to 4.5% in 1978. The 
dependence of the economy on the oil sector was clearly demonstrated at this time as
was the fact that while the revenue side could contract quite significantly in the short
term increases in expenditure both local and foreign were gathering a momentum that
Trin id a d  and  To b a g o .
Selected Indicators.
% G D P .
Year
ESI Ext bal* m  FISC. B al. IDÜ GDP grow th
SourCK CSO, ECLAC.
* refers to current oeeount.
37
would be difficult to control. Nevertheless, GDP continued to grow rapidly at 10% in 
1978 (Figure 16).
Nineteen seventy-nine was a year of relatively moderate growth in GDP, 3.5% 
being the slowest since the onset of the oil boom. Deficits were incurred in the fiscal 
balance and the external current account. Yet with the second oil price increase of 
1979-1980 rapid GDP growth was resumed, and revenues continued their upward 
growth, with total revenue moving from 36% of GDP in 1979 to 43% of GDP in 1980. 
The fiscal and external balances returned to a healthy surplus. But, in retrospect, the 
fortunes of 1980 which provided the high-point of the oil boom, disguised the signals 
which were being transmitted from as early as 1978 and which indicated a need for 
caution.
From 1981 a decline in 
petroleum revenues began so 
that by 1982 a deficit in 
merchandize trade had been 
created, and this was to 
continue in 1983 (Figure 17).
Due to the aforementioned 
momentum which had been 
created in spending there was 
an even more rapid decline in 
the fiscal and external balances, 
both moving once again into 
deficit in 1982 from which they 
were not to recover for the 
remainder of the survey period.
The rapid increase in 
public spending was possible 
because the windfall gains from 
petroleum accrued directly to the government via taxation of the oil companies. While 
it had been decided that these funds would be used for productive purposes, and for 
this purpose Special Long-Term Funds had been created, the leakage into non 
productive activities was nevertheless substantial. As a consequence recurrent 
expenditures grew rapidly from 17% of GDP in 1973 to over 31% by 1981. Subsequent 
efforts to reduce this have not been successful since it remained at almost 33% of GDP 
in 1986. On the other hand capital expenditure which was about 4% of GDP in 1973 
rose to a peak of almost 19% of GDP in 1980, and bore the brunt of the contraction 
in the subsequent years falling to just over 5% in 1985, although this increased once 
more to 8% in 1986.
Trin idad and Tobago.
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The Special Long-Term Funds which were intended for investment purposes set 
aside about TT$14 billion between 1974-1983. Of this amount about one third went to 
economic sectors; almost 40% was used for infrastructure, which was nevertheless often 
needed to facilitate the establishment of some of the large petro-chemical and other 
projects being implemented; and, over 20% of the funds were used for social projects. 
Resources in the funds were depleted by 1986. Some of the projects which required 
considerable resources suffered defects in project evaluation prior to their 
implementation, and inexperienced management once they came on stream.
In fact in Trinidad and Tobago the state is widely involved in directly productive 
activity, a legacy of burgeoning government revenues in the 1970s, and reflecting a 
widely shared philosophy that the state should control the "commanding heights" of the 
economy, coupled with the belief that the state could accelerate the development 
process by pioneering large or difficult investments. The state sector also expanded as 
the government took over non-viable entities in an effort to save jobs.
In 1970 the state held 
investments in 32 companies; by 
1980 this had risen to 61; and, 
by the end of 1986 the state 
held a portfolio of 66 
enterprises, employing over 
32,000 persons, and covering 
such activities as oil, gas, petro­
chemicals, asphalt, airlines, 
hotels, banking, insurance, 
sugar, mixed farming, fruit and 
meat processing, grain milling, 
maintenance and so on. Of 
these, many of which compete 
directly with the private sector, 
thirty seven are wholly owned, 
eleven are minority owned, one 
is 50% owned, and seventeen 
are minority holdings.
The involvement of the state is far larger than the nominal value of these holdings 
would indicate and which is estimated to have been TT$3953 m. in 1986. Loans, 
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that such assistance has amounted to TT$5,800m. between 1979-1984.20 The large 
state enterprises also account for a large portion of the external debt, about 42% of it 
in 1986.
Accordingly, the state enterprises currently represent a severe burden on the 
economy and measures are currently being explored to reduce the drag on the public 
purse, by inter alia, divestment, closures, or recapitalization.
The external debt which had hovered between 6.5%-7.0% of GDP from 1977 to 
1982, with the exception of 1978-1979, grew quite quickly in quantum due to the 
financing requirements for several major government commercial projects and 
infrastructure (Figure 18).
Between 1983-1985 this growth accelerated to average over 60% per annum, so 
that it moved from 8% of GDP in 1983 to rest at 22% of GDP by the end of the survey 
period. Similarly the debt service ratio which had grown slowly between 1977 and 1982 
(with the exception of 1980) when it was 2.4% of exports, increased in 1983 to 6.8%, 
increasing further to 11.3% in 1986. The increase in the debt service ratio is due in no 
small part to the decline in petroleum earnings which fell by 37% in value between 1980 
and 1986, and shows the risk of using the debt service ratio as an indicator where 
export earnings are dominated by one product which is sensitive to the vagaries of the 
international market.
A number of features regarding its external borrowing policy were unique to 
Trinidad when compared with its Caribbean neighbors. Firstly, as the recipient of 
windfall gains from oil, with a consequent rapid increase in GDP, it was not eligible for 
concessional financing. The predominant proportion of loans were therefore obtained 
at commercial rates, and carrying variable interest rates (Figure 19).
20 In 1987 alone TT$967 m, or almost 20% of recurrent expenditure, was 
budgeted to cover operating debts and contingent liabilities relating to the state 
enterprises, many of which are dependent on such support for their continued 
existence. Moreover the state enterprises are estimated to account for an even greater 
portion of the debt than indicated above at 65% of the public debt in 1987. (Source 
National Planning Commission - Medium Term Plan. Pp. 10, 116.)
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Unlike most other countries in 
the sub- region a large 
proportion of the loans were 
earmarked for commercial 
projects. Nevertheless, a 
substantial portion of the 
commercial debt was incurred 
for general development 
purposes21 which held out no 
promise of generating resources 
for repayment.
Yet even in the case of funds 
earmarked for directly productive 
enterprises in the state sector, 
there was much doubt about 
their capacity to generate the 
resources needed to repay the 
debt due to the aforementioned difficulties being experienced in making these 
operations viable.
Trinidad and Tobago.
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21 De Silva, Charles. "External Indebtedness in Trinidad and Tobago: the case 
of a middle income oil exporter." Page 9. It is estimated by the author that about 60% 
of the commercial debt was incurred for "general development purposes".
Conclusions
In conclusion, two major themes have permeated the study. Firstly, the nexus 
between the fiscal account, the external account, and the external debt. The second 
which is a corollary to the first, evaluates the rate of growth and the composition of the 
fiscal deficit.
Public expenditure policy provides a clear understanding, in the countries 
surveyed of the reasons for the growth of the external debt. When this related to 
current expenditure and the debt was incurred for activities which would not be self- 
liquidating benefits derived from such expenditure would be chimerical since they would 
have to be cut back in the future. Moreover, as these artificial benefits would have been 
internalized reduction or discontinuation of them would be seen as an undue hardship 
by the beneficiaries. Debt incurred for capital expenditure, however, held the prospect 
for repayment but repayment would only be forthcoming over the long-term in the case 
of infrastructure, or if a number of conditions necessary to secure commercial viability 
were met in the case of directly productive activities.
For the countries studied, the debt was incurred for three principal purposes:
(a) To sustain the level of economic activity and often non-productive 
employment during a period of foreign exchange shortage, caused by the two oil 
shocks and reduced earnings from exports. The assumption on the part of the policy 
maker was that the foreign exchange constraint would be temporary and the debt 
would be repaid as the export boom returned. The assumption did not, however, hold 
since the debt was incurred at historically low, but variable, rates of interest which were 
soon to return to the normal trends; and the export boom period of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s was not to return so that repayment became problematic.
(b) To achieve some measure of structural transformation. Efforts by the state 
in this regard may be divided into two phases:
(i) Initially, emphasis was placed on the structure of ownership moving away 
from foreign and private to local and public ownership and control. This 
was characterized by the acquisition of existing and often declining 
activities superimposed upon which was in-experienced and often deficient 
management. Accordingly, the internal efficiency of the firms declined at
42
the same time that external conditions were forcing international 
competitors to become more cost effective. Foreign exchange surpluses 
were therefore not generated to repay the debt, indeed the converse was 
true so that these enterprises served to increase the debt burden.
(ii) The second phase of structural adjustment was initiated in recognition of 
the changing patterns of international trade which did not favor the export 
of raw materials and primary commodities but rewarded the development 
of manufactures and services. While debt incurred for adjustment would 
ultimately generate new sources of foreign exchange, the process by 
which new export generating ideas could be identified and the necessary 
resources put into place was necessarily long and fraught with risk. The 
urgent need to reorient activities to new ways served to highlight the lack 
of adequate depth in human skills, which while proving to be adequate to 
perform the familiar and well worn socio-economic tasks were unable to 
provide a sufficiently rapid and flexible response to rapidly changing 
external conditions. For the countries surveyed the debt incurred for this 
purpose was obtained for periods which are too short to show returns 
before repayment, so that rescheduling has become an ongoing 
characteristic of debt management.
(c) To establish directly productive activities, as the state in an effort to force 
the pace of growth, became involved in relatively large commercial ventures. These 
projects which had been financed on strictly commercial terms often concealed a large 
infrastructural component. Moreover, sufficient attention had not been paid to their 
commercial viability, due both to an inadequate understanding of international marketing 
trends, or due to an underestimation of the importance of managerial competence on 
overall operational efficiency. Accordingly projects came on stream which were of 
suspect viability, constituting a further source of debt. Even where the conceptual 
hurdle of divestment had been overcome local private investors were hesitant to take 
the risk of trying to turn around large enterprises which had proved ill- conceived. In 
other cases, where the projects were viable they were often so large as to create a 
severe debt servicing burden in the short to medium-term.
The debt which must be seen as a symptom of past policy choices had, 
nevertheless, for a number of the countries surveyed, become a severe impediment to 
future economic growth, and absorbed so much of the recurrent budget that basic 
services such as health and education had to be severely curtailed. There is currently 
no realistic expectation that sufficient growth can be achieved in the medium-term So 
as to grow out of the debt problem. Moreover in the cases of Antigua, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica the burden of servicing the debt was 
sufficiently onerous for them to have accumulated arrears at various times since 1978, 
and most of these countries were exploring measures appropriate to their specific debt
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problems in order to provide some degree of debt relief and some of these measures 
are listed.
While changing future expectations quite drastically, the debt had also served to 
focus attention on the role of the state in economic activity and particularly the growth, 
size, and use of fiscal deficits. The debate about tiie desirability of state involvement is 
unresolved, but there now seems to be an emerging consensus that all enterprises 
should be subject to similar micro-economic disciplines, whether they are public or 
private. Moreover, there is a growing awareness of the limited capacity of the state 
apparatus to discharge its primary functions, so that an expansion into commercial 
activities is being regarded with greater caution than hitherto. This is especially true 
since government guarantees have tended to relax the safeguards normally applied by 
the lender to any commercial venture and public ownership tends to transfer the costs 
of failure away from those responsible for making the original decisions.
Finally, the period under review has brought about a clearer understanding of 
the manner in which the component parts of the economies interact as well as a more 
realistic search for the sources of real economic growth. It has also served to create 
a fresh awareness of the constraints facing the economic planner and therefore to 
caution him of the limits beyond which he might not prudently go in his efforts to force 
the pace of development.

